

**RECONFIGURING THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE  
IN EUROPE**

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**February 2004**

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>00 FEB 2004</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Reconfiguring The American Military Presence In Europe</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>UU</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>42</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

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The author would like to thank Dr. Thomas-Durell Young and Colonel Alan Stolberg for insightful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors or misinterpretations which remain do so despite their best efforts.

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ISBN 1-58487-151-2

## FOREWORD

What does NATO bring to U.S. national security in practical terms? This rhetorical question seeks not so much to provoke debate than to invoke NATO's potential. In the post-Cold War era, especially during the war on terrorism, NATO's *raison d'être* must expand beyond securing the immediate borders of member states.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines America's choices regarding the basing of ground troops in Europe. He considers three major options available to the United States—complete withdrawal, annual rotations, and restructuring the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence. While weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option, he does not lose sight of the ultimate objective of NATO—to provide credible land power for the full spectrum of operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen has expanded his concept of the integrated multinational division by introducing a NATO 3-3 Force Structure concept that rests on a smaller NATO ground force adaptive to the capabilities and wealth of member states; increases interoperability (technologically and procedurally); and supports the expeditionary force structure already in progress by the formal establishment of three standing combined joint task forces (CJTF). Additionally, he recommends the adoption of nine division-sized bases in Europe located at key geostrategic points for greater access to the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, the idea is daunting, but he lays out a pragmatic approach for implementation.

One of the monograph's strengths is not simply introducing innovative concepts for the Alliance; the author also ensures they are practical and within current capabilities. The reader will find Lieutenant Colonel Millen's ideas provocative but compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this insightful and controversial monograph as a topic of debate among European security specialists and Department of Defense.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
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RAYMOND A. MILLEN, an Army lieutenant colonel, is currently assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include *Infantry Magazine* and the *Swiss Military Journal*. His book, *Command Legacy*, was published by Brassey's in April 2002.

## SUMMARY

As the United States prosecutes the war on terrorism, it is also in the process of adjusting its global security posture. Not surprisingly, the American presence in Europe will be profoundly affected by the U.S. calculations, and hence by extension, so will NATO. It is no exaggeration that the whispered conversations within the Pentagon reverberate within the halls of NATO headquarters, so the ultimate decision has the potential to rock the Alliance, no matter how benign it may appear to the United States.

The United States has three basic options regarding its future ground presence in Europe – withdraw completely, rotate divisions, or restructure the Alliance to permit a smaller U.S. presence. Maintaining the status quo in Europe is not a viable option, since it does not rectify the U.S. over-extension of forces or accommodate the dynamics associated with the war on terrorism.

A withdrawal from Europe permits the consolidation of ground forces in the United States for power projection missions globally. Because the United States maintains relatively modern division-sized posts with contiguous maneuver training areas, unit readiness would be much higher than in Europe and certainly more cost efficient. Power projection from the United States provides greater flexibility in that the United States can rely on staging bases in Europe and elsewhere (“Lily Pads”) en route to trouble spots. Unfortunately, a withdrawal will likely result in a European loss of confidence in the United States and a de facto marginalizing of U.S. leadership and influence. More disturbing, the European Union (EU) will fill the void with its Rapid Reaction Force, which will compete with NATO for resources but fail to live up to expectations. In the end, the Alliance will not likely survive the trauma.

The rotation of divisions has the advantage of maintaining power projection flexibility without endangering U.S. commitment to the Alliance. However, given the enormous effort and associated costs for preparation, staging, moving, and reception, this option is incredibly expensive and time consuming. Given that rotations traditionally involve three units (those preparing, those

deployed, and those recovering), require extensive organizational reconfiguration for the mission, and present a host of logistical and administrative challenges, this option is impractical. It might look good on paper, but would needlessly distract the Army from more important matters.

Restructuring the Alliance to accommodate fewer and smaller units presents significant opportunities despite the initial challenges and visceral resistance. As opposed to the dozens of ill-equipped and undermanned divisions and brigades currently comprising NATO, a restructuring to nine integrated multinational divisions is in order. (See Table 2, page 17.) Organized into three permanent combined joint task forces with three divisions each, along with an allotment of specialized units at the CJTF level (NATO 3-3 Force Structure), Alliance members would contribute fully modern and manned forces in accordance with their capabilities and wealth. Because of the relatively small size of the new force structure, each member would contribute only four to five battalions or brigades to the Alliance.

In connection with restructuring, NATO should modernize its concept of unit stationing. Rather than relying on the 19th century concept of small casernes scattered throughout Europe, the Alliance should establish nine division-sized posts at geostrategic locations. Because each post would also require a contiguous maneuver training area as well as modern facilities, NATO should solicit members to compete for the contracts giving relative value to location, available land, and potential for modernization. Sufficient time is required for member states to hold referendums and select sites for the bases. The construction and other associated costs for new bases will be offset by the closures and sales of hundreds of obsolete casernes as well as the energy and maintenance savings with modern facilities.

The NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized bases fits perfectly with the new NATO Military Command Structure and NATO Response Force. Most importantly, the NATO 3-3 Force Structure provides a standing force for force generation, currently a long and tedious process within the Alliance. Integrated multinational divisions permit all NATO members to make a meaningful contribution and increase the interoperability (both

technologically and procedurally) between the United States and its allies.

Recommendations:

- Adopt the NATO 3-3 Force Structure.
- Establish a NATO working group to explore nine division-sized bases.
- Adopt a public awareness campaign to inform member states of the need for a NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized bases.
- Withdraw U.S. political support of, and a priori support of, the use of NATO assets for the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

The United States can have its cake and eat it too without appearing unilateralist. The United States needs a power security partner, and any decision which endangers that need will be to U.S. detriment. The implementation of these long-term recommendations will provide the Alliance with a powerful, sustainable expeditionary force and significantly ease the security burden on the United States.



# RECONFIGURING THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

## **Introduction.**

The United States and Europe are approaching a crossroads regarding common security interests. After the world wars of the 20th century, culminating in a cold war, few national security specialists in the United States would argue that the stability of Europe is not an enduring U.S. national security objective. In the same vein, while the European elite may wrinkle its collective nose at U.S. approaches to foreign policy, particularly with regard to the U.S. preference for the Big Stick approach, few in Europe would dispute the stabilizing benefits of American power.

As America defines its new security posture vis-à-vis Europe, the issue of continued U.S. military presence in Europe will have enormous strategic implications within the Alliance. The United States has three basic options regarding its future presence in Europe--withdraw completely, rotate divisions for annual tours, or restructure the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence.

The United States could exercise the option of status quo, meaning it maintains its presence more or less intact, even if this includes shifting ground forces farther east and southeast for closer proximity to the Middle East. This option does nothing to address U.S. global security concerns or the war on terror. As the number of these concerns, operations, and missions expand without a concomitant increase in the size of the military, existing regional commitments in Europe and Korea need to be revisited. Sooner or later something has to give, and if the United States missteps in its approach, the whole security apparatus, to include NATO, could collapse. Pragmatically, the status quo approach resolves nothing.

The three options provide the United States with the opportunity to harness existing resources more efficiently. As this monograph addresses these choices, it explores their effect on U.S.-NATO relations, on NATO readiness, and on long-term cost benefits. Naturally, a failure to strike a balance among these issues may result

in unintended consequences, causing irreparable damage to the Alliance. The intent of this monograph is to explore the pros and cons of the first two options as a lead in to the third and preferred option. This option intentionally ignores existing U.S.-European Union (EU) initiatives, agendas, and frictions to get to the heart of the argument. Most of the obstacles go beyond the scope of this monograph and tend to obfuscate the basic need for change.

In discussing the reconfiguration of U.S. ground forces in Europe, the reconfiguration of NATO must also occur. Both go hand-in-hand and represent the most profound way to redress U.S. strategic concerns as well as enduring problems within the Alliance.

### **Withdrawal from Europe.**

A complete withdrawal of ground forces from Europe constitutes the most traumatic option for the health of the Alliance. Relying on its robust power projection capabilities, the United States would conceptually use select bases in Europe for the staging of ground and air forces to a crisis region. These bases would serve for interim reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of combined joint task forces (CJTF). Ground forces would also use available time at these bases to train on specific mission essential tasks. The use of way stations, sometimes called “lily pads,” presents the United States with substantial advantages.

Consolidation of ground forces in the United States permits greater strategic flexibility for power projection. Given the limited available ground forces and growing global responsibilities, maintaining as many forces as possible in the homeland allows the United States to concentrate strategic air- and sea-lift for rapid projection of forces to any point in the world.

The U.S. basing of units also obviates the reliance on European states for support of a diplomatically contentious operation. For instance, ground units stationed in Germany could be immobilized if the German government demonstrated its opposition to a military operation by denying or delaying the use of airspace, rail, airbases, and seaports, despite treaty obligations. Additionally, other European neighbors to Germany, such as Austria, Switzerland,

and France, could complicate deployments by denying the use of airspace either as an invocation of neutrality or as a sign of displeasure regarding U.S. policy. As the EU gains prominence and given that it is often at loggerheads with the United States over virtually every issue, the problem of cooperation in Europe likely will grow. Even though obstructionist governments could derail the “lily pad” option as well, the United States would retain the flexibility to bypass Europe.

Division readiness would benefit from home stationing as well. Although Germany offers extraordinary personal and professional rewards, military service in Germany can be a trial. Decaying living and work facilities in pre-World War II casernes require vast expenditures for maintenance and renovation. Even though it would be cheaper in the long run to raze existing casernes and build anew, this option has never been exercised adequately. Living and working conditions remain spartan and demoralizing, especially when soldiers happen to see the modern German casernes.

The scattering of brigade and smaller units throughout Germany in small casernes hampers coordination, training, and logistics, as well as creating to a redundancy in supply and administrative services. Training and readiness issues suffer the most though. Few casernes possess a maneuver training area. The vast majority of units must conduct annual training (sometimes less often) at Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, or Baumholder for range qualification and some maneuver exercise training. Far from routine, unit rotations to these training areas require extensive preparation. Weeks of coordination and preparation are required for rail movement, wheeled convoys, inprocessing (establishing ammunition and supply accounts, signing for billets and maintenance facilities, drawing ammunition, and range control certification), and outprocessing (clearing the above accounts, cleaning and turning in issued property and items, initiating property accountability procedures, and billets and maintenance facility inspections), and rail and convoy deployment back to home station. Under this morass of bureaucracy, less time and effort is spent on training than getting to the training areas and back.

With the end of the Cold War, exercises in the German countryside are practically nonexistent. German environmental

concerns, payments for maneuver damage, maneuver restrictions, and the danger to civilians are too great to make them worthwhile. In contrast to Germany, American posts accommodate whole divisions with contiguous, large maneuver training areas. None of the obstacles that hamstring units in Germany applies. Hence, unit readiness in the United States is considerably higher.

Withdrawal from Europe carries significant strategic drawbacks though. Despite the advantages of basing ground forces in the United States, the effect on NATO would ultimately prove more deleterious to U.S. national security because it would directly affect the U.S. relationship with all NATO nations. Critics, who continue to harp on the lack of threat brought about by the fall of the Soviet empire, are intellectually mired in the Cold War. That the NATO Alliance no longer serves its original purpose is self-evident: from collective self-defense to the defense of collective interests. NATO has and continues to realign its vision, missions, and structure to address the new strategic realities. Simply put, NATO is no longer just a security umbrella for the protection of Europe; its shade has extended beyond. Just as the wheel has evolved exponentially beyond the original intent of its inventor, NATO has evolved beyond the wildest dreams of its creators.

The presence of U.S. ground troops in Europe represents a tangible U.S. commitment to NATO. The manner of this commitment differs greatly than the original design. Initially, the United States provided the air power (and by implication the nuclear umbrella), the United Kingdom—the sea power—and continental Europe—the land power. The complacency of the continental land powers (including the problems associated with rearming Germany) and the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb confounded this security arrangement should the Soviets invade. So the United States stationed permanent ground troops (initially four divisions) in Germany as a trip wire to deter Soviet fait accompli invasion stratagems.<sup>1</sup>

American ground presence not only assured Europeans of the U.S. commitment; it also enhanced the influence of the United States in European security matters and engendered a binding trust in America among the allies. Admittedly, in terms of military power, U.S. air and naval power in Europe was substantial; nevertheless

these forces were not as visible to the Europeans as ground forces, and because these forces could withdraw quickly out of harm's way, their assurance to the Europeans could never match the presence of ground troops. Hence psychologically, U.S. ground forces provided greater security to the European psyche.

Had NATO and the United States not weathered a slew of crises together – Suez, 1956; Hungary, 1956; Berlin, 1961; France, 1967; Czechoslovakia, 1968; and Soviet saber rattling throughout the 1970s and 1980s – perhaps the issue of ground forces would be minor. But the fact remains, U.S. ground forces' presence during these events reassured Europeans that American commitment through NATO remained stalwart. At this stage in the relationship, a withdrawal in any form (e.g., further reductions) represents a definitive break from the Alliance, a separation presaging the final divorce. To a continent steeped in diplomatic cynicism, American assurances to the contrary are meaningless.

U.S. ground forces and headquarters stationed in the United States will certainly remain declared to NATO, but as other crises, national security concerns, and shifting priorities surface, the United States will become inattentive to Europe. U.S. participation in future NATO military operations would likely devolve to the Air Force or at best, an ad hoc arrangement with a U.S. Joint Task Force operating independently. Once U.S. ground forces are separated from their European counterparts, interoperability will decay. In a crisis, little time will be available for reacquaintance; hence the degree of cooperation will be limited.

Inevitably, Europe will distance itself from the United States as well. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) proponents will pounce on any opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in Europe, and a withdrawal would serve as a pretext to advance the EU agenda.

Because space abhors a vacuum, pan European politicians will use the withdrawal to advance their EU Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) initiative. For those unfamiliar with EU foreign policy, the EU RRF *appears* as a pragmatic and necessary force to revitalize European militaries. Professed as a fully modern, interoperable, expeditionary force of 60,000 troops, the EU RRF would play a larger role in coalition

warfare and shoulder an equitable burden of military expenditures with the United States. As with prior European military ventures, the devil has always been in the details. Two enduring security matters plague the EU—inattentiveness to military readiness and embryonic federal institutions.

As the headline goal for the establishment of the EU RRF was 2003, European rhetoric has overreached badly. To date, the idea of a European expeditionary force is more figment than reality.<sup>2</sup> In addition to insufficient troop strength, the EU RRF lacks adequate numbers of precision weapons, refueling aircraft, surveillance equipment, secure communications, and intra-theater airlift; and acquisition of these are at least a decade away. U.S. Ambassador to NATO R. Nicholson Burns has repeatedly warned that the European contribution to modern military operations will remain meager for years.<sup>3</sup> European assurances regarding progress in the field of modernization are cold gruel for the United States, which must shoulder the security burden while Europe ambles along.

Of all the military deficiencies, airlift capabilities are the most pertinent. Power projection defines the added value a nation brings to modern security alliances, and the issue of credible airlift capabilities directly affects Europe's caliber of deterrence. As long as EU power projection capabilities remain mediocre, the use of a force mechanism, which is integral to deterrence, is missing. Adversarial parties may be willing to conduct talks with the EU, but they will not take them seriously. Moreover, without the ability to conduct initial entry operations, the EU RRF brings no added value to the United States in times of crisis. What practical reason is there for the United States to engage in coalition building with the EU?<sup>4</sup>

EU political institutions grant no mechanism for the rapid deployment of forces. European states show neither the desire nor the inclination to surrender their foreign policy to a central European polity. European ministries require months of debate before even agreeing to deploy forces.<sup>5</sup> Without a central federal authority, unencumbered by consensus mechanisms, the potential rapid capabilities of the EU RRF will remain irrelevant. European federalists seek salvation in the common foreign and security policy, but this pursuit ignores Europe's fundamental problems—trust

and confidence. It would truly be a wonder if Europe progressed politically beyond a loose confederation of states, given its historical baggage of inveterate mutual suspicions honed by centuries of intrigue and betrayal. On the other hand, the United States, through NATO, has a remarkable record of instilling common cause that no other European state has duplicated.<sup>6</sup> The absence of U.S. ground forces in Europe risks marginalizing the U.S. leadership, and left to its own devices, the EU is unlikely to become a trustworthy security partner.

The belief that the EU RRF will ultimately benefit NATO is illusory and detrimental to the Alliance. The hope that the EU RRF will become the European security pillar under NATO is fraught with risks. If ESDP advocates are less than candid about their intentions, the EU RRF will act as a Trojan horse, infecting the Alliance and destroying it from within. The EU diversion of scarce military spending from domestic military forces to fund ESDP and the frequent attempts to establish separate headquarters speak volumes regarding intent.<sup>7</sup> Since the vast majority of NATO EU countries' military expenditures fall far below the 2.0 percent of GDP requirement, the diversion of resources has a marked impact on the military readiness of NATO units.<sup>8</sup> The fundamental question remains whether the EU RRF will be available for NATO missions – unlikely.

The EU is committed to the Petersberg Tasks charter, which deals exclusively with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management, including peacekeeping.<sup>9</sup> Once the EU RRF begins deploying on these missions, its availability as an expeditionary force for NATO is diminished. The EU RRF will depend largely on NATO support (command and control, airlift, combat support, and combat service support) for some time.<sup>10</sup> Given that most deployments in support of the Petersberg Tasks will require an enduring presence, a substantial number of units will be involved in preparation, deployment, and recovery. Hence, not only will the EU RRF compete with NATO for scarce resources, but it will also consume NATO resources in the process.

The temptation for the EU to use the RRF as a counterbalance to U.S. power is alarming and not unfounded. The EU, more enamored

with diplomacy and incentives, placing its “faith in international institutions, regimes and norms to tackle problems of common concern,”<sup>11</sup> could use the EU RRF as a political weapon to stymie U.S. foreign policy. By denying NATO the use of the EU RRF during a crisis, the EU would have a political sledgehammer to humiliate and undermine the United States. Traditionally, the United States prefers to build coalitions bilaterally with NATO members during crises, so the impact of RRF denial would purely political. To counter this approach, France has introduced provisions in the EU draft constitution that prohibit bilateral agreements between the United States and individual EU states. In essence, EU member states would be compelled to adhere to the EU common foreign and security policy, preventing direct negotiations with the United States.<sup>12</sup> Naturally, the EU seeks to form a solid political bloc, and EU enthusiasts would like nothing better than to dismantle the one organization from which the United States wields tremendous influence – NATO. As U.S. Ambassador Burns opines, “Their vision of Europe as a countervailing power to the United States is one that would destroy the cooperative spirit that has held us together in NATO.”<sup>13</sup>

The danger posed by a complete withdrawal of ground troops from Europe is such that many Europeans may view it as a harbinger of complete U.S. detachment from the Alliance. The temptation will be great for EU advocates to fill the void with the EU RRF. Disturbingly, given the dearth of forces, funding, and resources, the EU RRF will not be able to fill the U.S. boots. It follows that the EU will clamor for a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); after all, with no U.S. presence, what need is there for an American SACEUR? Europe’s demonstrated inattentiveness to military expenditures and modernization combined with the sole pursuit of Petersberg Tasks and the insidious policy of fettering the United States will result in an enervation of the Alliance and eventually its dissolution. Consolidating U.S. forces in the United States appears to make good military sense on paper, but in the end, the United States will find itself shouldering more of the security burden than ever before.

## **The Annual Rotation of Divisions.**

While not as drastic as a complete withdrawal, the adoption of a rotation policy represents a compromise of sorts. Although still highly speculative, the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions could rotate to the United States once their deployment in Iraq ends in 2004 and 2006, respectively. It follows that the families and a number of civilian contractors would also move to the new home stations for both divisions.

This option is not without substantial benefits for the Army. At some point, the United States will begin the rotation of divisions to Europe for 1-year tours. Without family members, the logistical footprint (i.e., travel, moving, family housing, shopping facilities, schools, etc.) will no longer be a factor and result in increased savings for the military.

Benefiting from the insights gained from the stationing of troops in Germany, the United States should negotiate with potential host countries for division-sized posts with contiguous and large maneuver training areas. Additionally, the posts should have modern living and work facilities as well as land set aside for further expansion projects (simulation centers, additional ranges, urban combat centers, etc.). Granted, the expenses associated with building a new post are worth debating, and some points bear noting. Without family members and the attendant infrastructure requirements, the number of facilities would be drastically smaller than the norm. NATO pays for 75 percent of construction costs, with the United States footing 25 percent of the bill.<sup>14</sup> Assuming an enduring commitment to NATO, the initial expense of new facilities would become offset over time as a result of energy savings and lowered upkeep requirements. Moreover, the cost savings of training in the maneuver training area as opposed to deploying to a training area will pay for itself. More importantly, U.S. units would enjoy the same training opportunities as their sister units in the United States.

European NATO members are unlikely to split hairs over annual rotations or permanent basing. As long as the United States maintains a ground presence in Europe, the Alliance will have tangible proof of

U.S. commitment, securing U.S. influence and leadership.

Despite its merits, annual rotations leave some problems unresolved and indeed raise new ones that question their practicability. The insights gleaned from rotations to the Sinai, Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, suggest that, for every division deployed, two are tied up either in preparation for or recovery from the deployment. The noun “bureaucracy” may have French origins, but the U.S. Army made it profound. At a minimum, a division designated to rotate to Europe will begin the planning and preparation 6 months prior to deployment. Multiple command and staff recons (battalion to division) to the host station are a necessity. Preparation for overseas movement (POM) entails a myriad of details that consume a division’s time and resources to include activation of family support groups, designation of the rear detachment chain of command, identification of nondeployable soldiers and requests for fillers (the inevitable replacements for nondeployable soldiers), family care plans, palletizing personal and unit equipment, and processing through the Program Objective Management (POM) site, to name just a few key activities.

As an aside, any thought of reducing the rotations below a year doubles the number of divisions preparing or recovering from rotations. With an Army of ten divisions, this option is not sustainable.

The disparity in the types of U.S. divisions makes annual rotations particularly problematic.<sup>15</sup> The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for each division is unique; hence a deploying division cannot simply assume control of its predecessor’s equipment. It really is like mixing apples and oranges, and leaves the Army with options that cause more problems than solutions.

Divisions could deploy with all their equipment to Europe, which is cost prohibitive and time consuming. Once one calculates the round-trip movement costs—rail transportation to a seaport of debarkation, loading onto ships, sea transportation, air transportation, off-loading at the seaport of embarkation, and rail movement to their station—the Army annual budget rises exponentially. Factoring in a conservative movement time of 6 weeks and approximately 1 month for maintenance recovery, a

division consumes about 9 months in preparation and movement. No doubt, divisional units will continue a modicum level of training throughout, but the combat effectiveness of a division would remain an area of concern during and after a rotation.

The Army could adopt a standardized “European” division MTOE, which would require a reorganization of the division for the European MTOE. For each division earmarked for rotation, reorganization would add at least 2 more months of preparation time in order to request personnel from other units to fill the MTOE positions and to identify the personnel who cannot deploy because they are either excess or nonapplicable to the MTOE. Describing this process is not nearly as confusing as executing it. To make matters more complicated, if that is possible, a period of extensive train up for the entire division would be required. Assuming the European MTOE would be an armored or mechanized division, light infantry divisions (82nd, 101st, 25th, and 10th Mountain) would need to learn how to command and control armored and mechanized units as well as master maintenance and supply procedures. Add another 4 months to the preparation time. Since light infantry has neither the inclination nor the desire to operate as a mechanized force, the equipment status ratings of the division would plummet under its tutelage.<sup>16</sup> The most pragmatic course would be to use the heavy divisions (3rd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and 1st Armored Division) for rotations. Despite variations in MTOE, they are more aligned to execute rotations with the least internal turbulence.

Using a light or eventual medium division MTOE in Europe would carry strategic disadvantages for the United States. Given that the light forces are the first responders for global crises, in terms of strategic lift, they are far easier to deploy from the United States than elsewhere, particularly for the Pacific Rim region.

The option of just rotating brigades into Europe does not resolve the inherent problems. Preparation and realignment requirements will not diminish, and cobbling together brigades and support units for the rotation will require a fair amount of time before they become cohesive. Assuming that the division headquarters at home station

and the host nation remain stationary, both will need to expend inordinate amounts of time in the logistical and administrative movements of rotating their brigades and supporting units. If the idea is simply to rotate independent brigades to Europe, then each will require its own support package--hardly an efficient use of limited resources. This option only makes sense if the Army converts to an independent brigade-based organization, hence eliminating division headquarters. Until that happens however, the brigade rotation option will lead to redundancies and infrastructure requirements that currently plague the Army in Europe.

Of course, rotations cannot be implemented in a vacuum. Existing security obligations (Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to date), limit the availability of divisions and, more importantly, the command headquarters. The result would be an army in perpetual deployment, with soldiers spending an exorbitant amount of time away from their families. In time, this problem would self-correct—just as soon as all the divorces are finalized—but then again, the retention issue might raise its ugly head.

The rotation system carries implications for the Alliance as well. One of the strengths of the Army system lies in the family community. Military families bring a sense of cohesiveness that transcends other professions. The family community also draws U.S. forces indefinably closer to the host communities. Daily contacts through mutual sports events, schools, business, employment, shopping, and sightseeing create bonds. Absent the family community, host countries are unlikely to form a special relationship with their U.S. partners. To be sure, they will not enjoy the economic benefits or the cultural exchange opportunities. In short, U.S. forces would remain one step removed from an occupation force, no matter how benign.

Rotating divisions is not just a challenge—the euphemistic “opportunity to succeed” that Army commanders enjoy saying when given a particularly difficult task—it is a bad idea. As with total withdrawal, it sends a message that the United States is trying to find a way, step-by-step, to disengage itself from the Alliance. More importantly, it does not solve the fundamental problems that have plagued the Alliance since the end of the Cold War—burden sharing.

## **The Challenge for the United States in Europe.**

The question of whether to withdraw or rotate ground troops does not address the basic problem confronting the United States vis-à-vis Europe. Namely, the United States must ensure its leadership and influence in Europe remain solid; it must reduce its presence in Europe as part of its global realignment, but do so without risking its commitment to Europe; and it must find a way to make the Alliance more effective militarily so it can actively participate in ground operations.

For some time now, the United States has shouldered the lion's share of the military burden because of an imbalance in interoperability. This is partly technical, but a large part of it is also procedural. The key to working more closely does not lie solely with compatible equipment, munitions, and repair parts; to operate as a team, partner units need to train with one another regularly. The geographic separation of Alliance military units remains a major obstacle to greater cooperation.

## **Adoption of a New NATO Force Structure.**

The United States must fundamentally change the way it operates within NATO. The U.S. Army cannot charge ahead with Transformation and then carp about its NATO partner militaries not carrying their own weight. NATO European nations are not inclined to spend more money on the military, at least not in a way which will benefit the Alliance. To achieve greater integration and interoperability and a greater degree of allied cooperation in NATO operations, the Alliance must organize into permanent integrated divisions.

Permanent multinational integrated divisions provide numerous benefits to the Alliance as an expeditionary force and to the United States for burdensharing. Under this concept, NATO can downsize to nine divisions, resulting in an overall savings of millions of dollars per year. The Alliance can direct this money towards modernization and the establishment of nine division-sized posts. This size force is more than adequate to address most security threats immediately,

and would permit the Alliance to mobilize. Integrated divisions permit all members to contribute to NATO operations automatically, eliminating the need to build coalitions of the willing and resort to the tedious and time intensive force generation process. At the national level, integrated divisions negate the practice of passive nonparticipation in NATO missions. Participation is automatic unless individual partners actively opt not to participate. Exercising nonparticipation places a heavy political burden on a member state to declare publicly the reasons for withdrawing from the mission. The onus for taking such a stance weighs particularly heavy on a state since it carries with it diplomatic consequences. Breaking faith with the Alliance and risking political isolation would cause even the most obstreperous members to pause before crossing the Rubicon.

At the national level, the member state contribution would represent only a small part of the national army. Because NATO would only be concerned with the quality of the contributed force, the readiness of a partner state's remaining armed forces is of no import to the Alliance, nor is the overall level of gross domestic product (GDP) committed to military expenditures. A member state's military contribution to NATO would be a factor of its wealth, population size, and military capabilities (Table 1). Member states must ensure their military contribution is compatible with the rest of NATO, as well as fully manned, equipped, and modernized.

For collective defense to be truly equitable and effective, the larger and wealthier partners must bear the greater burden, but as the table shows, the burden is not onerous. The United States proves the exception because of its global responsibilities and stationing. Still, the U.S. contribution is measured in brigades, not to mention Special Operating Forces and headquarters not included in the table.

The new NATO force structure requires an expeditionary capability with the flexibility to task-organize according to the mission before deploying. A CJTF configuration with permanent CJTF headquarters is appropriate. The expeditionary qualities of a permanent CJTF forces NATO to train, think, and operate as a cohesive entity. If NATO can train as a CJTF, it will fight as a CJTF.

Country	Population (in 000's) 2002	GDP (PPP in Billions of U.S. \$) 2002	GDP per Capita (PPP). <sup>a</sup>	Active Force <sup>b</sup>	Military Contribution
Belgium	10,275	297.6	29,000	39,260	5 units
Bulgaria	7,621	50.6	6,600	68,450	4 units
Canada	31,902	923.0	29,400	52,300	6 units
Czech Rep	10,257	155.9	15,300	49,450	5 units
Denmark	5,369	155.5	29,000	22,700	4 units
Estonia	1,416	15.2	10,900	5,510	4 units
France	59,766	1,540.0	25,700	260,400	6 units
Germany	83,252	2,184.0	26,600	296,000	7 units
Greece	10,645	201.1	19,000	177,600	5 units
Hungary	10,075	134.7	13,300	33,400	4 units
Iceland	279	7.7	27,100	120 <sup>c</sup>	---
Italy	57,716	1,438.0	25,000	216,800	6 units
Latvia	2,366	20.0	8,300	5,500	2 units
Lithuania	3,601	29.2	8,400	13,510	4 units
Luxembourg	448	20.0	44,000	900	1 unit
Netherlands	16,068	434.0	26,900	49,580	6 units
Norway	4,525	143.0	31,800	26,600	5 units
Poland	38,625	368.1	9,500	163,000	5 units
Portugal	10,084	182.0	18,000	43,600	4 units
Romania	22,317	152.7	6,800	99,200	3 units
Slovakia	5,422	66.0	12,200	26,200	3 units
Slovenia	1,933	36.0	18,000	9,000	3 units
Spain	40,077	828.0	20,700	177,950	4 units
Turkey	67,309	468.0	7,000	514,850	4 units
UK	59,778	1,520.0	25,300	210,450	4 units
USA	280,562	10,082.0	36,300	1,414,000	4 units

<sup>a</sup> Derive by dividing GDP (PPP) by population.

<sup>b</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 2002-2003*.

<sup>c</sup> Paramilitary forces.

Source: CIA, *The World Fact Book*, 2002, Internet, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/fact-book/index.html>.

**Table 1. Military Contributions of NATO States.**

The nine divisions are organized into three permanent CJTFs with three divisions assigned – light, medium, and light – coined the NATO 3-3 Force Structure. With the new NATO Readiness Force, SOF, and other government, nongovernment, and international organizations assigned to the CJTF headquarters, the NATO 3-3 Force Structure reflects an alignment for the strategic environment (Table 2).

The formal assignment of a multinational Special Forces battalion provides unique capabilities to the CJTF. Special Forces are critical for shaping success in an unstable or crisis region. Often deployed into troubled regions well in advance, these forces gain an intimate understanding of unique issues and impart their insights to the CJTF command and staff, which in turn can conduct mission planning and preparation as a contingency. Because virtually every country has Special Operating Forces, each of which bring niche capabilities and skills, it is worth exploring forming SF multinational battalions, permitting a greater sharing of skills, ideas, and experiences.

Reconfiguring into integrated multinational divisions is not without obstacles though. The issue of sovereignty will need to be vetted by the Alliance. Under this organization, countries would surrender a degree of command authority of the contributed units to the Alliance.<sup>17</sup> Because any multilateral agreement regarding the assignment and employment of the contributed units for training and deployment precludes the Transfer of Authority (TOA) requirement, member states may fear the domestic repercussions of a deployment in support of a contentious security issue. Rather than face the diplomatic repercussions of withdrawing their forces during a crisis, it would be more astute not to support the initiative.

The member state officer corps would quickly realize that this fundamental reorganization would negatively affect the size of their armed forces, career paths, and national prestige. This issue would also require serious discussion to ensure member states maintain a military hedge to their nation's security strategy even if it leads to some redundancy.

Some states, like the United States, may not relish the idea of being under foreign commanders, even though its troops have served under foreign commanders before (since 1776). Furthermore,

Country	CJTF 1 (USA)			CJTF 2 (UK)			CJTF 3 (GER)		
	Division (Light)	Division (Medium)	Division (Heavy)	Division (Light)	Division (Medium)	Division (Heavy)	Division (Light)	Division (Medium)	Division (Heavy)
	NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVO								
Belgium	Artillery	Engineer	MI			Mil Police		Div HHC Motorized	
Bulgaria		Motorized	Mil Police	Signal	Artillery		Lt Infantry		Artillery
Canada	ADA			Artillery	Engineer	NBC	Div HHC Airborne	Signal	
Czech Rep	ADA		Aviation		Artillery		RSTA		Armor
Denmark		Motorized	Aviation						
Estonia	Support Airborne	Mil Police		ADA	Signal	Aviation	Gendarme	MI	Mechanized
France		Div HHC Motorized							
Germany	MI	Signal	Engineer	Aviation	Motorized		Mountain		Div HHC Armor
Greece	Signal	Artillery			Div HHC Motorized		MI	ADA	
Hungary			ADA	Lt Infantry		Signal			Mil Police
Italy			Artillery	Div HHC Mountain	Mil Police	Mechanized		Motorized	Aviation
Latvia	Gendarme							Support	
Lithuania							ADA	Mil Police	MI
Luxembourg		RSTA		Support					
Netherlands		Support	Mechanized	MI			Aviation	Artillery	Engineer
Norway	Div HHC Mountain		Support			Engineer		Aviation	NBC
Poland		Motorized	Signal			Armor	Artillery	Support	
Portugal				Engineer	RSTA	MI			Support
Romania	Engineer	MI			Motorized				
Slovakia		ADA	NBC			ADA	Engineer		Signal
Slovenia			Armor	Gendarme			Signal	Engineer	
Spain					Aviation			Motorized	ADA
Turkey	Mountain			Support					
UK		Aviation			MI	Div HHC Armor		Engineer	
USA	Aviation	Motorized	Div HHC Armor	Airborne					

**Table 2. Proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure.**

reorganizing into multinational divisions is just plain difficult. The divisional readiness levels would be low for a time while the division reconciles the language barriers, differing procedures, and equipment compatibility.

Nonetheless, coalition warfare and by extension the use of multinational divisions have become a reality in modern warfare (e.g., the on-going operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). Resolving the problems in peacetime is less costly than in the midst of a conflict. Finally, the long-term implications of reorganization are such that the United States will enjoy an increasing level of active participation from all member states rather than a select few.

### **Basing Considerations.**

The adoption of nine integrated multinational divisions permits European countries to replace hundreds of small casernes with nine large bases. Three criteria shape the establishment of these bases – location, land, and costs.

The security challenges for Europe no longer lie to the east but to the south and southeast. The orientation of NATO towards the Middle East and Africa requires forces that can deploy quickly using a combination of intertheater aircraft, sealift, and rail movement. Given the volatility of these outlying regions, deployment times must be measured in days, not weeks. Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria appear best sited for power projection posture to the Middle East, whereas Italy, France, and Spain provide superb access to the Mediterranean Basin and Africa. Of the nine divisions, only the three heavy divisions require quick access to seaports. The rest can be located anywhere in Europe that has sufficient airbase infrastructures. So, the impression that central Europe has no geostrategic relevance understates the flexibility of airlift.

Availability of sufficient land for a division-sized base with a contiguous maneuver training area requires the greatest scrutiny because such bases are essential for readiness. NATO must solicit competitive land contracts formally among its members. The Alliance must view this initiative as a long-term project to give member states time to acquire sufficient space for these bases. This period will

permit member states to study possible sites which match NATO's land requirements, vote on the proposition, and relocate affected citizens once NATO approves the contract. This monograph does not advocate the uprooting of entire villages such as practiced by autocratic regimes. Instead, these governments must recognize the familial ties to the land and the village. Given the tremendous cost savings from closing obsolete casernes and the attendant land sales, governments can compensate the affected citizens above the value of their property and the cost of relocating (including family burial plots). This issue is so delicate and fraught with potential excesses, that NATO (or EU) must establish an oversight commission during its execution. For member states, two incentives influence their desire to win the basing contract: prestige regarding the contribution to the Alliance, and tremendous positive economic impact of having NATO bases in their country.

### **The Anatomy of a Base.**

The size, infrastructure, and design of the new NATO bases must reflect the transformational requirements to meet future strategic challenges. Modern living and working facilities represent only a portion of the land needed. To preclude the problems associated with training in Germany, the maneuver training area must be contiguous to the base and possess sufficient land to permit the unhindered exercise maneuver of at least two brigade combat teams, plus the construction of ranges, simulation centers, specialty facilities/areas (e.g., urban combat, peacekeeping base camp, strong point, and forest combat), and an airfield. Ultimately, land requirements are predicated on the type of division. Heavy divisions will need greater space and more open terrain than light and medium divisions, so member states can bid on the type division that is most adaptive to their landscape. Hence, an armored division would be well-suited in the open expanses of Spain, and a light division quite comfortable in the mountainous regions of Greece and Italy.

Due to the size of a heavy division base, the CJTF headquarters is ideally suited for co-location or in the vicinity. The location of the airfield permits the DCFTF to deploy quickly, and the large

maneuver training area permits combined joint training exercises with its echelons above division units, and elements of its light, medium, and heavy divisions.

Large maneuver training areas accommodate multiple units training in noncontiguous operations, which characterize Rapid Decisive Operations. Modern ranges – from small arms to combined arms to joint arms – permit the full array of ground and air units to exercise capabilities in a permissive environment. As recent conflicts have demonstrated, conducting joint operations only during combat operations is rife with hazards and unintended consequences. State-of-the-art simulation centers for weapons training, driver training, command and control training, and war gaming provide tremendous benefits at low cost.

As conflict grows in complexity, honing combat skills in specialty facilities pays high dividends. Conflict trends reveal that urban terrain will figure more prominently in future operations. Combat training and security and stability operations in urban terrain are absolutely critical. Ideally, any abandoned villages as a result of citizen relocation should be incorporated into the maneuver training area. A prime example of a premier urban combat center is Bonnland, Germany, which was an actual village prior to World War II. Bonnland's town grid, construction and layout of buildings, underground system, and surrounding areas give unequaled training benefits and realism to urban combat training. Attempting to build such villages from scratch would likely be too expensive to be worthwhile. For realism, cost savings, and training benefits, the conversion of an existing village is the best solution.

A peacekeeping base camp permits units to train in a crisis environment with concurrent training in immediate action drills, deploying a quick reaction force, operating check points, clearing hasty minefields, and conducting control of civilians on the battlefield.

Reserving an area for strong points permits soldiers to experience the tremendous value of defending and the excruciating difficulty in reducing entrenchments. To preclude units from gaining too great a familiarity of the layout, strong points should be dismantled and the area leveled after each training exercise. This approach permits

units to vary the design of strong points as well as training leaders and soldiers on the planning and preparation of a strong point.

The forest combat area familiarizes units with the difficulties of operating in wooded terrain. This highly perishable skill is usually tested upon the first enemy contact in combat with devastating results. U.S. units at least have the opportunity to train in such terrain at their home station maneuver training areas and at the Joint Readiness Training Center. European units rarely have the opportunity to train in such areas because they are only available in civilian sectors and are subject to environmental restrictions. On military reservations, the military can be good stewards of the environment and still receive valuable training. The byword should be "No more Huertgen Forests."

A C-17 capable airfield would serve several purposes. Naturally, it would serve for airlifting the NRF, DJFT, and HRF to a crisis region, and it would serve as a staging area for training involving army aviation and air squadrons. Ground units would also use the airfield for forced entry and hostage rescue training.

Integrated multinational divisions offer numerous intangibles that enhance cohesion and a sense of community. Living and training in one location permit allies interpersonal contact as a matter of routine. This proximity fosters immersion in English (NATO's official language), training procedures, and cooperation among partner units. The current practice of major training exercises conducted infrequently may have value at the higher echelons of command, but has limited value at lower levels because skills acquired from collective and combined training are perishable. If not conducted routinely within the division training management cycle, they disappear quickly.

The construction of family housing and supporting infrastructure is not a frivolous or profligate expense. Military communities form unique bonds, which enhance division cohesion. The daily interaction of allied and U.S. families will lead to a quickening of integration through the friendships formed. Frequent contacts among families, as well as exposure to Armed Forces Network (TV) and radio improve language skills, ease the cultural adjustment period and create informal lines of communication among soldiers.

Because the United States would have a reduced force of four brigades and headquarters staffs, its family footprint would be relatively small, and an assignment to NATO would not become a hardship tour for married soldiers with the family problems that occur when a military spouse is deployed over an extended period.

Partnership extends beyond the gates of the base. The reputation of NATO begins or is enhanced in the local community. Mutual participation in base open houses, local festivals, and other special events create deeper relations between host nation citizens and the military. Employing the local populace for citizens in the battlefield training provides a readily available resource at minimum cost.

Investment in these training complexes seems cost prohibitive. To reiterate, modern living and maintenance facilities and a nearby maneuver training area provide tremendous financial savings and more time available for training. The maintenance and operating costs of these facilities would be a fraction of the current maintenance and renovation costs associated with antiquated, pre-World War II casernes in Germany. The proximity of the facilities to the contiguous training area obviates the costs associated with rail and convoy movement. Significantly, units need not spend the hundreds of man-hours coordinating in-processing and outprocessing currently associated with the major training centers in Germany. NATO members share associated costs (the United States pays for 25 percent of common costs).<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the tremendous cost savings associated with smaller and fewer units make these centers fungible. Since the U.S. presence in Europe is enduring, the investment in modern facilities makes economic sense.

Rather than accepting the visceral arguments that new NATO bases are too intrusive and cost prohibitive, one should acknowledge that the consolidation of modern facilities and training areas at only nine bases saves time, resources, and money in the long term. Instead of the cluster of casernes with distant scattered maneuver training areas in Germany, units can enjoy superb, immediate, recurrent combined-joint training with responsible impact on the environment and little intrusion on the citizens of the host country. Stationing integrated multinational divisions at nine European bases permits the United States to reduce its force contribution without

marring the sensibilities of U.S. commitment to the Alliance.

The operative question is whether this restructuring of NATO is adaptable to the NATO command and force structure. If it is not, the concept becomes impractical. The recent reforms, following the November 21-22, 2002, Prague Summit, have set the conditions for this operational restructuring.

### **The Streamlined Military Command Structure.**

Considering that NATO's military command structure during the height of the Cold War stood at 78 major headquarters, the recent reorganization to just eleven major headquarters is remarkable (see Figure 1).<sup>19</sup>

The redesignation of the strategic commands as Atlantic Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) reveals a greater commitment to transformation and expeditionary capabilities.<sup>20</sup>

Formerly the Allied Command Europe (ACE), ACO has streamlined into three major joint forces commands, each with an expeditionary posture. Joint Headquarters Command is located in Lisbon and has assumed the operational command function of the former SACLANT with the capability to form a maritime CJTF.<sup>21</sup> Joint Forces Command North and South integrate their land, air, and naval component commands into functional joint forces. Between them, they can form a land-based CJTF.<sup>22</sup> For the first time in its history, NATO is structured and beginning to think as a combined-joint expeditionary force.

NATO's International Military Staff conceives a new force structure that permits units "to rapidly deploy to crisis areas and remain sustainable, be it within or outside NATO's territory, in support of both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations."<sup>23</sup> Since the majority of NATO's current ground forces are unwieldy and lack the crucial strategic mobility, the military staff's criteria for highly deployable tactical forces with requisite tactical and strategic mobility are essential to expeditionary operations.<sup>24</sup> Multinationality characterizes another key feature of the new force structure, permitting partner countries and international organizations a




Figure 1. NATO Military Command Structure.

definitive role in NATO operations while exhibiting to potential threats “solidarity and its political cohesiveness.”<sup>25</sup>

Because the NATO force structure is the force provider for the land-based CJTF, it should provide the CJTF with its expeditionary character. In this capacity, it falls short. NATO basically has repackaged the tactical units into high and low readiness forces without really improving their tactical and strategic mobility. The High Readiness Forces-Land (HRF-L) fluctuates in size from the Spanish division-equivalent corps to the 10-division Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) with deployment criteria of 90 days or less upon alert. Since the two Deployable Combined Air Operations Centers (DCAOC) and the High Readiness Forces-Maritime have the capability to deploy within hours and days, the HRF-L becomes the bottleneck. The Forces of Lower Readiness are intended to reinforce and sustain an operation if needed.<sup>26</sup> But, if the various divisions of the HRF-L are insufficient, how would two to four more divisions of the Forces of Lower Readiness-Land (FLR-L) be enough? They would not, and hence only give the impression that other member states are active participants. In a serious crisis, the HRF-L would provide the time for member states to mobilize their armed forces.

The multinational character of the HRF-L is suspect as well. A multinational corps is a mere pretense to true multinational participation. Its subordinate units remain national by organization and are geographically separated. Since integrated multinational divisions provide all the necessary elements for participation and burden sharing, and since the organization of CJTFs into light, medium, and heavy divisions enhance rapid deployment, it is logical that the NATO force structure should comprise nine integrated multinational divisions.


### **The NATO Response Force.**

Critics could point out that the NATO Response Force (NRF) provides the NATO force structure with its expeditionary component with a deployment readiness of 5-30 days (see Figure 2).<sup>27</sup> With an initial strength of 5,000 by October 2003 and a target of 20,000 by 2006, the NRF is a remarkable organization and would fit perfectly

with the recommended NATO 3-3 Force Structure.<sup>28</sup> NATO's criteria for the NRF were precise:

a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, inter-operable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed. It will serve two distinct but mutually reinforcing purposes. First, it will provide high-readiness force able to move quickly to wherever it may be required to carry out the full range of Alliance missions. Second, the NRF will be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance's military capabilities and, more generally, for their continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges.<sup>29</sup>

The NRF will be able to act independently or as the initial entry force for the HRF and will be self-sustaining for 30 days.<sup>30</sup>




**Figure 2. NATO's Graduated Response Forces.**


In consonance with NATO's new missions, the NRF missions include crisis response (including peacekeeping), support of counter-terrorism operations, consequence management (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events and humanitarian

crises), peace enforcement, embargo operations (maritime, initial land, and no-fly zone), initial entry force, demonstrative force pack (quick response operations), and noncombatant evacuation.<sup>31</sup> As is apparent, NATO's missions not only overlap the EU Petersberg Tasks but also have the robust capability to execute them.

The tip of NATO's spear is the Very High Readiness Force, a battalion-sized joint task force (see Figure 3).<sup>32</sup> It forms the vanguard of the NRF's initial entry brigade with a potent forced entry capability. NATO discovered that the CJTF was too unwieldy a headquarters to deploy and thus developed the Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) concept. So even though the original NATO plan is to form CJTFs from subordinate JFCCs, DJTFs will become the command and control for the NRF and by extension the HRF (see Figure 4).<sup>33</sup>



**Figure 3. Very High Readiness Force.**



**Figure 4. Command and Control.**

The significant and unnecessary problem with the current force structure arises from the issue of force generation. The generated forces for the NRF originate from the HRF ground, naval, and air forces. NRF force generation is a two-phased process initiated a year prior to units assuming the duty. The initial force generation conference creates the generic force in accordance with the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement. The final conference determines the specific make up of the force upon activation and once the JFC mission analysis tailors the force.<sup>34</sup>

Even though NATO is well-versed in force generation, the process is involved, and may require artful negotiations with Alliance members to pledge specific forces for the NRF. Force generation conferences resemble negotiations because Alliance members may be reluctant to contribute forces or opt to contribute forces that are unsuited or not needed for a task force (e.g., infantry versus engineer units).<sup>35</sup> Such a process requires months to garner the necessary forces and is ill-suited for tailoring high readiness forces for crisis response. Force generation is likely to remain a contentious issue as long as the Alliance maintains its current form of segregated divisions.

The NATO 3-3 Force Structure greatly reduces the tedious force generation process. If a member state declines to participate in an operation, the redundancies provided by the 3-3 Force Structure permit the replacement of the unit. With a ready-made force postured already for expeditionary operations, the CJTF command and staff generates the forces for the NRF quickly, efficiently, and most important, equitably.

NATO has made great strides with reforms as it postures to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Certainly, no other security organization exists in Europe to compete with the Alliance. Given the tremendous almost revolutionary drive of NATO towards reform since the end of the Cold War, continued reform is expected. The final step lies in the adoption of the 3-3 Force Structure. With such a force, NATO will achieve assured expeditionary capabilities.

## **Conclusions.**

As it reconfigures its ground forces in Europe, the United States must consider the ramifications of its decisions. If reconfiguration results in a military divorce between the United States and Europe, the Alliance will be doomed. Prominent figures on both sides of the Atlantic would like nothing better than to see the demise of the Alliance in pursuit of their own agendas. A rash decision regarding the basing of U.S. ground forces would only serve the purposes of NATO's opponents.

A withdrawal of U.S. ground forces would create the impression that the United States is no longer serious about the Alliance. Alleged pan-Europeanists would use this action as a pretext to replace the United States with the EU RRF. It would only be a matter of time before the SACEUR is replaced by a European commander. The rotation of U.S. divisions on a yearly basis would likewise create the impression of a diminished U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Worse, the execution of this scheme would be too disruptive to the U.S. Army to be practical. The United States experimented with a similar rotational system during the Cold War, and it was discontinued due to the difficulties in implementation. The proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure permits the United States to downsize its

presence in Europe without undermining the Alliance.

The proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure permits the development of a long-term plan for dealing with the lingering problems of collective contributions, force generation, and basing. Downsizing the Alliance to nine integrated multinational divisions not only makes budgeting and burden-sharing sense, it also permits all Alliance members to make meaningful contributions and take shared risks in security matters. This initiative also permits the United States to downsize its ground presence to about four brigades, a Special Forces component, and two major headquarters—a size of about 10,000-12,000 personnel.

If the Alliance does not adopt the integrated multinational division concept, the European side of the Alliance will continue as a junior partner with diminishing contributions. Moreover, without these divisions, Europeans will view the downsizing of U.S. ground units as another example of U.S. disengagement from Europe. The NATO 3-3 Force Structure provides an immediate source for force generation, particularly combat support and combat service support units, which the Alliance lacks in sufficient numbers. Moreover, NATO can conduct long-term deployments without over-extending itself or over-using key units and personnel.

As a long-term initiative, NATO needs to realign its basing concept to permit swifter access to out-of-area regions and the consolidation of land and resources. Division-sized bases with living, working, and training facilities, as opposed to hundreds of small casernes scattered throughout Europe, enhance unit readiness, interoperability, and cohesion within the Alliance.

#### Recommendations:

- Adoption of the NATO 3-3 Force Structure.
- Establishment of a NATO working group to explore nine division-sized bases.
- Adoption of a public awareness campaign to inform member states of the need for a NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized bases.
- U.S. withdrawal of political support of, and a priori support of, the use of NATO assets for the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

The United States can have its cake and eat it, too, without appearing unilateralist. The United States needs a power security partner, and any decision which endangers that need will be to the U.S. detriment. The implementation of these long-term recommendations will provide the Alliance with a powerful, sustainable expeditionary force and significantly ease the U.S. security burden.

## ENDNOTES

1. Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988, pp. 39-48, 61-62. Although atomic weapons were the backbone of the security umbrella, the presence of U.S. ground troops clearly implied that the United States would go to war if the Soviets invaded Western Europe, hence bolstering deterrence.

2. "Ready, or Not: Europe's not-so-rapid-reaction force," *Economist*, May 24-30, 2003, Internet <http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2003/s20030523187678.html>, p.1

3. *The Economist*, p. 1; R. Nicholas Burns, "NATO Has Adapted: An Alliance With A New Mission," *International Herald Tribune*, May 24-25, 2003, Internet <http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2003/s20030527187885.html>, p.1.

4. Lorenzo Cortes, "Wald: Europeans Not Addressing Strategic Lift Deficit With A400M," *Defense Daily*, September 3, 2003, Internet <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2003/s20030903213389.html>.

5. Illustrating this gridlock is the EU intervention into Albania in 1997 in which the EU states became so mired in debate that an Italian-led coalition was forced to resolve the crisis nearly 5 months after it emerged. Even the EU intervention in Congo (Operation ARTEMIS) from June to September 2003 can hardly qualify as successful crisis action planning since France provided the lion's share of the contribution, and hence few members shared any risks for debate.

6. Even without conjuring up the Cold War solidarity, the military and post-conflict operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and even Iraq illustrate the dynamics of U.S. leadership regarding coalition building.

7. John O'Sullivan, "Ill-Conceived European Defense Alliance Gains Steam," *Chicago Sun Times*, October 21, 2003, Internet, <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031022226578.html>.

8. Raymond A. Millen, *PAX NATO: The Opportunities of Enlargement*, U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, pp. 14-15.

9. Dr. Andrew Dorman, *European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare: Implications for the United States Army*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2002, p. 6.

10. By the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU, the EU is permitted access to "NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations." "Berlin Plus Agreement," SHAPE Information, Internet, [http://www.anto.int/shape/news/2003/shape\\_eu/se030822a.htm](http://www.anto.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm). See also Philip Shishkin, "U.S. Decries EU Plan To Set Up Military Center Outside NATO," *Wall Street Journal*, October 3, 2003, Internet, <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031003221877.html>.

11. Ivo H. Daalder, "Are the United States and Europe heading for divorce?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 553, 561.

12. Bernard Jenkin, "Europe Must Stop Trying To Compete With NATO," *London Financial Times*, October 8, 2003, Internet, <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031008222970.html>.

13. Burns, p. 2.

14. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, *NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement*, Congressional Budget Office, August 2001, Internet, <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index-2976&sequence=0&from=0>, pp.4-5. See also *Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement*, February 1998, Internet, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/nato/>, p. 2.

15. The MTOE for each division varies widely: 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2d Infantry Division (with one Stryker Brigade), 10th Mountain Division (Light), 25th Infantry Division (with one Stryker Brigade), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Cavalry Division, and 4th Infantry Division (Digitized).

16. This observation is not meant to denigrate light divisions but to highlight the fundamental differences between heavy and light divisions. No doubt quite a few officers, NCOs, and enlisted in light divisions will have mechanized experience, but establishing the maintenance infrastructure and procedures will take months before operations begin to run smoothly. By that time, the rotation will be over.

17. Command authority is a particularly contentious issue for the United States. It should not be so because the precedent was set long ago. U.S. forces have served under foreign commanders in the Revolutionary War (von Steuben, Lafayette), the Civil War (many commanders fresh from Europe could barely speak English), World War I (Foch), and World War II (Alexander, Montgomery,

and Slim). U.S. military and political leaders need to get in front of this issue and explain that such thinking is resurgent isolationism.

18. Lis and Selden, p.2.

19. The NATO Military Command Structure is adapted from Lieutenant Colonel Brick T. Miller, *Transforming the NATO Military Command Structure: A New Framework for Managing the Alliance's Future*, ACUS Occasional Paper, Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2003, p. 11.

20. "New NATO Command Structure," *NATO Issues*, June 18, 2003, Internet [http://www.nato.int/issues/military\\_structure/command/index-e.htm](http://www.nato.int/issues/military_structure/command/index-e.htm), pp. 1-2. The most substantial change was the re-designation of Strategic Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) as Atlantic Command Transformation (ACT), which no longer has an operational command function. ACT's primary function is to "oversee the transformation of NATO's military capabilities." Since the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation is dual-hatted as the Commander U.S. Joint Forces Command, transformation initiatives between the United States and the Alliance will be more closely aligned. Moreover, ACT will establish a number of joint-related training and research centers in Europe.

21. Luke Hill, "NATO Base Cuts in New Command Revealed," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 11, 2003, p. 1. Internet, <http://www2.janes.com/search97/vs.ots?action=View&VdkVgwKey=/content1/janesdata/>.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *The New NATO Force Structure*, International Military Staff, January 24, 2003, Internet, <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/force-structure.htm>.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.* *Operational Testing of NATO High Readiness HQ Finalised*, NATO Update, January 10, 2003, Internet, <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/update/2003/01-january/e0109a.htm>. See also Colonel Bradley Mason, *NATO Response Force: Graduated-readiness forces and the NRF*, briefing for the SMI conference on NATO Land Systems, June 11-12, 2003. Referred to as Mason, SMI Conference.

27. Mason, SMI Conference.

28. Kevin Dougherty, "NATO Commanders Say Rapid-Response Force Should Be Ready by October," *European Stars and Stripes*, June 19, 2003, Internet, <http://ebird.dtic.mil/jun2003/s20030620194260.html>. See also Luke Hill, "NATO

ministers approve Response Force," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 18, 2003, p.

1. Internet, <http://www2.janes.com/search97/vs.vts?action=View&VdkVgwKey=/content1/janesdatat/>. Referred to as Hill, NATO ministers.

29. *NATO After Prague*, NATO Office of Information and Press, December 2002, p. 4, Internet <http://www.nato.int>.

30. Hill, NATO ministers.

31. Mason, SMI Conference.

32. *Ibid.* This conceptual model was developed by NATO's former Regional Command North.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Toler, *Force Generation For NATO: Acquiring forces for NATO and ensuring their operational effectiveness in the field*, briefing for the SMI conference on NATO Land Systems, June 11-12, 2003.